Black Edge by Sheelah Kolhatkar [Book Summary – Review]


It’s regular information nowadays that Wall Street has a great deal to respond in due order regarding. After the occasions of the 2007-2008 monetary emergency, one would trust that administrations would crackdown on the abundances at the core of worldwide fund. 

Tragically, that has not been the situation, and the unfairness of this situation is impeccably embodied by Steve Cohen, a Wall Street financial specialist who made billions of dollars by achieving a “black edge” over individual speculators. 

Cohen obtained illicitly, or “black,” insider data about organizations’ exhibitions to increase a favorable position over individual speculators. To the outside world, he was supernaturally fortunate, continually wagering on the correct organizations at the ideal time. In all actuality, as the insightful columnist Sheelah Kolhatkar found, he was in all likelihood using an uncalled for preferred position to outperform his opponents.


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Chapter 1 – Steve Cohen was a capable trader and was honored with early achievement, however, dealt with indictments of insider exchanging.


In 2008, amidst the overall financial crisis, US government specialists were bringing down Raj Rajaratnam, a Wall Street titan, when they found something intriguing. 

Rajaratnam was unlawfully utilizing inside data from organizations; he exchanged on this data and benefitted from it hugely. The specialists were interested in how one name kept springing up during interviews with Wall Street insiders: Steve Cohen. 

Was there a considerably bigger case standing by to be revealed? Rajaratnam, it turned out, was little fry – the examination was just barely beginning. 

So who is Steve Cohen? We should begin from the earliest starting point. 

Steve Cohen was conceived in 1956 and experienced childhood in a white-collar class family on Long Island, New York. Since early on, he was intrigued by funds. 

As an understudy at the acclaimed Wharton School at the University of Philadelphia, he read the Wall Street Journal each morning and followed the financial exchange. He was gifted as well: he played poker with his kindred understudies and raked in some serious cash doing as such. 



In 1978, recently out of Wharton as a 21-year-old, he found occupation at Gruntal and Co., a New York business firm. And still, at the end of the day, his aptitudes shone through: in one evening, he made $4,000, an enormous figure in 1978. 

Cohen was fruitful, making $5 million to $10 million per year. Yet, it didn’t take long for the main indications of bad behavior to show up as he dealt with indictments of insider exchanging. 

In 1985, the Securities and Exchange Commission, or SEC, investigated Cohen’s exchanges. Cohen had gotten inside data through a companion about an inevitable takeover of gadgets organization RCA by General Electric. Cohen put intensely in RCA shares and made $20 million in benefits when the takeover was declared. 

Even though the criminal case was later dropped, it firmly showed Cohen had to some degree an unconventional way to deal with exchanging. 


Chapter 2 – Cohen developed his speculation firm, SAC Capital, which deliberately looked for inside data.


Inside 14 years, Cohen moved from being a humble junior merchant to a respected Wall Street character. It would just involve time before he wished to break free of Gruntal and adventure out all alone. 

So it was that in 1992, Cohen established his venture firm, SAC Capital Advisors, utilizing his initials for the organization name. It was a fence stock investment that benefitted by putting away cash accumulated from various people and foundations. 

Cohen started with $23 million and nine workers and met with galactic achievement. In only three years, SAC had quadrupled in size to $100 million. From that point onward, SAC multiplied every year, outperforming $1 billion in resources by 1999. 

Cohen’s pockets were flooding. In any case, exactly how could he figure out how to make to such an extent rapidly? 

Cohen wager on momentary developments in stock costs. Every day, he accumulated data about the market, purchased huge quantities of offers, and afterward sold them when their value rose. 

However, in the long run, turned out to be more convoluted than that. SAC methodically endeavored to get an exchange on inside data. 



By the last part of the 90s, SAC was thinking that it’s harder to benefit from momentary exchanging, and Cohen detected that things should have been turned up a score. 

Until that point, his brokers were ignorant of the enterprises or organizations whose shares they were exchanging. Accordingly, Cohen began to recruit brokers with a “major edge,” that is, dealers with profound information, aptitude, or individual associations in a specific industry. 

SAC needed individuals who knew and would uncover important knowledge – as such, inside data. 

For example, if a potential recruit lived in a similar neighborhood as an industry chief, this was a reward. Such “fortuitous events” would be open doors for making individual associations. 

Each conceivable association was mined in an offer to develop benefits. 


Chapter 3 – SAC was blamed for controlling stock costs and a culture of looking for inside data got implanted.


By the mid-2000s, Cohen was probably the most extravagant man on the planet. He had an individual fortune of about $10 billion. He permitted himself a couple of extravagances with this money and regularly spent too much on costly work of art. 

Yet, something appeared to be off. SAC’s immense benefits appeared to be simply unrealistic, and they’re just must be something obscure going on. 

It was nothing unexpected to anybody, at that point, when, in 2006, SAC Capital was blamed for controlling stock costs. The first to point fingers were Biovail, a Canadian medication maker, and Fairfax, a Canadian insurance agency. 

They blamed SAC for spreading bogus and negative reports about their exhibition and strategic approaches, which thus made their stock costs drop. Merchants at SAC had the option to make enormous benefits when they wager against these organizations’ prosperity. 



For example, Fairfax representatives professed to have gotten evening time calls from mysterious voices that murmured that Fairfax was false. Also, mysterious sites showed up making examinations among Fairfax and Enron, a firm which had itself crumpled after huge extortion disclosures. 

The allegations were all unwarranted, yet they were as yet seen by the administrative specialists, the SEC, and the FBI. 

All the while, at SAC, the obscure culture that deliberately looked for inside data proceeded. 

SAC’s methodology was to wager on momentary stock-value developments, particularly of the sort that happens after explicit occasions, for example, organizations’ benefit declarations. SAC supervisors pushed their dealers to converse with their contacts and influence them to get important data before any official declarations. 

A supported method to get significant data was utilizing supposed master systems, for example, Gerson Lehrman Group. These systems are intended to interface financial specialists with organization chiefs. In fact, in these paid-for “discussions,” the chiefs can’t share inside data. 

In any case, they dropped significant clues, and the data streamed back to SAC dealers. They set out to utilize this information. 


Chapter 4 – In 2008, SAC utilized investigation into Alzheimer’s to profit in monstrous insider exchanging.


Very nearly 5 million individuals have Alzheimer’s ailment in the United States alone. The infection causes serious cognitive decline and, sadly, no successful treatment has been found. 

Advancement in such a manner might bring about a huge number of dollars in benefits, so any improvement makes certain to pull in Wall Street’s consideration. 

At the point when two pharmaceutical organizations, Elan and Wyeth, attempted to build up Alzheimer’s drug during the 2000s, Mathew Martoma, a SAC merchant, normally needed to find out additional. The new medication was to be called Bapineuzumab, or Bapi for short. 

Martoma set about structure solid relations with Dr. Sidney “Sid” Gilman, who was associated with bapi’s improvement as the seat of Elan’s security observing board of trustees. He had likewise consented to a private arrangement identified with all parts of bapi’s turn of events. 

Regardless, Martoma was convincing. The two went through hours on the telephone and in a little while, Martoma had driven Gilman into talking about the secret bapi preliminaries. 

It was this data, which Gilman in the end gave to Martoma, that SAC used to incredible impact. 



Because of the calls, Martoma was at first exceptionally certain that bapi would be fruitful. In this manner, Cohen and Martoma assembled more than $700 million in Elan and Wyeth stocks. 

The last bapi test results were expected to be delivered on July 28, 2008, at the International Conference on Alzheimer’s Disease in Chicago. Gilman was to be a keynote speaker and one of a minuscule hover of individuals who realized the profoundly private outcomes ahead of time. 

Indeed, hypothetically at any rate. He had additionally indicated them to Martoma. 

Martoma understood that bapi was a failure most definitely – it was appropriate just for few patients. 

In this way, on July 20, Martoma called Cohen and they consented to unobtrusively disburden themselves of stock. They even began shorting stocks, implying that they sold stocks before the costs dropped and afterward repurchased the stocks at a lower cost. In doing as such, they clutched the stocks yet also brought home the distinction between their underlying selling cost and ensuing, lower price tag. 

When the bapi results were authoritatively delivered, Elan and Wyeth share costs had plunged, making Martoma and Cohen a cool $276 million all the while. 


Chapter 5 – By the last part of the 2000s, the US administrative specialists started to focus on insider exchanging.


SAC’s plan of action was vigorously and dependent on insider exchanging. 

All things considered, in the last part of the 2000s, insider exchanging was the basic practice at Wall Street mutual funds. Not at all like firmly observed huge banks, the generally new flexible investments worked underneath the radar of the controllers and could pull off homicide. 

In any case, that was soon to change. 

In 2009, the FBI started to examine SAC’s dark strategic approaches stealthily. 

Specifically, the FBI was looking for dubious exchanges – and their key objective was Cohen himself. In any case, their methodology was to move toward ensnared junior SAC investigators, at that point push them to give proof against their chiefs. The thought was that they would bit by bit accumulate proof about higher-positioning dealers until they at long last got to Cohen himself. 

They before long discovered Jonathan Hollander, a previous junior examiner at SAC, and exactly what the FBI was after. He had exchanged stock Albertsons, a grocery store chain, and a companion of his had spilled data to him about a looming takeover. 

Hollander was the FBI’s first connection, and they sought after a make way to Cohen from that point. In any case, they found that Cohen had made a security component to ensure himself. He requested that his examiner’s rate likely exchanges on a scale from zero to ten, along these lines guaranteeing that he wasn’t acting naturally exchanging straightforwardly with inside data. 



At about a similar time, the U.S. Protections and Exchange Commission (SEC) began to research, as well. 

They were investigating SAC’s stupendous achievement when exchanging the Elan and Wyeth stocks only preceding the declaration of the aftereffects of the bapi preliminaries. It was dubious no doubt. 

At that crucial point in time, on November 19, 2010, the Wall Street Journal distributed an article itemizing the FBI’s and SEC’s examinations. The brokers had been admonished and turned out to be frightened, and immediately set about pulverizing their hard drives. The examination’s spread had been blown. 


Chapter 6 – In 2011, SAC broker Mathew Martoma and Dr. Sidney Gilman went to the consideration of US specialists.


When the Wall Street Journal had uncovered what the FBI and SEC were doing, the specialists had no real option except to move rapidly. Else, they risked Wall Street merchants crushing all proof of insider exchanging before they could get to it. 

Only a couple of months after the fact, in May 2011, US specialists had their first forward leap and set Mathew Martoma and Dr. Sidney Gilman on their presume list. 

The SEC had recognized Gilman as the putative basis preliminary outcomes leaker months sooner, yet they stayed uncertain who his contact at SAC was. Subsequently, the SEC summoned Gilman’s telephone records, and in the end, recognized a puzzling telephone number. 

It was Martoma’s, one of the portfolio directors at SAC. 

The agents likewise found that Martoma had reached Cohen in the blink of an eye before SAC auctions off its Elan and Wyeth shares. On the head of all that, Martoma was at that point on the FBI’s database as being “known to the Bureau.” They were shutting in. 



Things disentangled immediately when they began burrowing on Martoma. First off, Mathew Martoma wasn’t his genuine name – it was Ajai Thomas. They likewise found that, like Thomas, he’d needed to leave Harvard Law School rather out of nowhere. 

In his second year of classes, Martoma had battled to adapt to course work. With an end goal to get a pined for a legitimate clerkship, he’d produced the evaluations on his record. It was after this that he’d changed his name. 

Not long after the FBI forward leap, their specialists faced the pair at their separate homes, itemizing their doubts of insider exchanging. 

Be that as it may, Cohen remained the FBI’s definitive objective, and they required the pair to coordinate – they required their assistance in getting the genuine soil on Cohen. 


Chapter 7 – In late 2012, Mathew Martoma was captured and SAC paid a record fine to settle charges of insider exchanging.


When, in 2011, FBI specialists pulled up before Mathew Martoma’s home, they had solid doubts yet no genuine proof of insider exchanging. In those conditions, everything they could do was pose inquiries and work on his determination. 

Notwithstanding, after a year, that had changed. This time, when the specialists showed up for the subsequent time, they weren’t there to idly chatter. They captured him on the spot. 

Be that as it may, the FBI’s underlying cross-examination of Dr. Sidney Gilman and Mathew Martoma didn’t continue so well. 

When gotten some information about the logical subtleties of the bapi preliminaries, Gilman could review everything about it. However, when it came to inquiries concerning his relationship with Martoma, he stonewalled specialists and said he was unable to review any subtleties. 

In the interim, Martoma avoided as much self-incrimination as possible Amendment so as not to implicate himself; all things considered, he was confronting a jail sentence of as long as ten years. 



To agents, Martoma’s move appeared to be odd, as he could without much of a stretch have decreased his possible sentence on the off chance that he involved Cohen – however he didn’t. Potential elements could have been that Cohen was taking care of Martoma’s legitimate expenses, or that Martoma dreaded retaliation on the off chance that he crossed Cohen. 

In August 2012, Gilman at long last consented to participate completely. He conceded that he had given Martoma inside data about the bapi test results. 

With that admission, the FBI had enough proof to capture Martoma. Be that as it may, they despite everything couldn’t squeeze charges on Cohen and SAC. 

Cohen, however, knew about the peril. Thus, in the spring of 2013, SAC consented to fork out a record fine of over $600 million to settle the instances of insider exchanging. 

All things considered, from Cohen’s point of view, it seemed well and good to settle before the circumstance compounded. Furthermore, there was as yet the hazard that Martoma would affirm against him. All the lawful issues would break down, he thought if he composed a check. 

Be that as it may, it wasn’t finished at this point. The SEC was as yet quick to charge Cohen himself. 


Chapter 8 – SAC consented to pay another fine and Martoma was condemned to jail – however, Cohen strolled free.


At long last, there was another improvement for the situation. The SEC got their hands on an email that conceivably associated Cohen to another instance of insider exchanging at SAC. 

In mid-year of 2008, Mike Steinberg, a SAC broker, got inside data about the PC organization Dell’s disillusioning business figures, which weren’t yet open. Steinberg utilized the data to wager that Dell’s stock cost would drop, and when it did, he got a cool $1.4 million. It was an email that Steinberg had sent to Cohen about this data that the SEC presently possessed. 

Accordingly, to settle this extra case, SAC consented to pay a record fine of $1.2 billion in July 2013. 

The SEC’s definitive point was to utilize this data to convict Cohen of insider exchanging. All things considered, he had gotten Steinberg’s email and sold Dell stocks promptly a short time later. 

Be that as it may, Cohen’s legal counselors were shrewd. They contended Cohen just read around 10% of his 1,000 or so day by day messages, thus had most likely never observed the implicating note. Since it wasn’t evident that he had followed up on the email from Steinberg, sentencing Cohen was troublesome; it essentially couldn’t be demonstrated. 



Now, since the SEC didn’t need their entire case to come slamming down, they dropped this line of the request. This primary case was settled with SAC for another $1.2 billion. 

Before long, in the fall of 2014, Mathew Martoma was condemned to nine years in jail. He was over and again allowed the chance to coordinate and affirm against Cohen since, in doing as such, he could have diminished his sentence altogether. Be that as it may, he didn’t uncover anything, we despite everything don’t have the foggiest idea why. 

Cohen, in any case, was himself never sentenced. To rub salt into the injury, he has since gotten more cash-flow than any time in recent memory. In April 2014, he rebranded the discolored SAC Capital Advisors brand as Point72 Asset Management and essentially continued onward. Despite their proceeding with examinations, US specialists have experienced a mental blackout. 

Cohen left a rich man. Actually, in 2014, Cohen earned $2.5 billion.


Black Edge: Inside Information, Dirty Money, and the Quest to Bring Down the Most Wanted Man on Wall Street by Sheelah Kolhatkar Book Review


Steve Cohen was, and stays, a skilled financial specialist. Yet, his venture firm, SAC Capital Advisors, was based on a plan of action that included unlawful insider exchanging. A portion of Cohen’s dealers were sentenced for insider exchanging following quite a while of examination – yet Cohen himself was never seen as blameworthy of any criminal allegations. He keeps on making billions of dollars and stays dynamic in the financial area.


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Savaş Ateş

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